Developing a proportionate, fair and efficient IRRBB framework in the EU

Our response stresses that the current framework is too complex and challenging to implement for smaller institutions with non-complex operations and limited market risk exposure. Although we need a sufficiently prudent management of interest rate risk amongst all EU/EEA banks, the framework should also consider the peculiarities of national banking models and the interest risk inherent in national markets.

As regards the definition of large decline for the purpose of the net interest income (NII) supervisory outlier test, the proposed “Option B” referring to a cost related metric seems more aligned with established internal interest rate risk management methodologies. Yet, the removal of the administrative expenses term, which generates volatility and complexity, is pivotal to favouring this option.

Considering the limited ability of the standardised approach to capture adequately the exposure of each entity to IRRBB, any obligation to use it should be conditional on the competent authority having demonstrated that it would be more relevant than the internal model approach (IMA) it would replace.

In the area of credit spread risk arising from non-trading book (CSRBB), the scope of the framework is too extensive as it includes all instruments. On the contrary, credit spreads, which are based on a market perception, should not apply to illiquid and non-market instruments whose value does not change according to these market spreads. The scope should thus be restricted to instruments that have a clear market price transparency andare easily tradable on a large and deep enough market, because only these assets are subject to the market perception. Moreover, a clear definition of the terms “market credit spread” and “market price of credit risk” is needed.

To avoid different interpretations and ensure a level playing field, it should be stated explicitly in the Guidelines, that non-marketable instruments, such as loans to customers, should be generally exempted from CRSBB as they are covered by the bank’s credit risk management framework.

Finally, the new IRRBB standardised methods for the economic value of equity (EVE) and NII seem to be very calculation intensive but, at the same time, less granular than many banks’ internal models. We therefore stress that both banks and supervisors may lose interest rate risk management insights if banks are required to apply them by their national authorities. ​